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Abstract 
The UK is home to a substantial number of heritage and tourist railways which make a 
significant contribution to their local economies. These are mostly constructed on the routes 
of closed lines, and include large numbers of earthworks of uncertain construction and 
unknown strength. Recently, there have been earthwork collapses, most notably on the 
Gloucester and Warwickshire Railway during 2010 and 2011. The Office of Rail Regulation 
has also noted a number of safety incidents on heritage railways, all attributable to 
management failures. This paper describes an analysis of the Victorian earthworks on the 
Bo’ness and Kinneil Railway, a five-mile long heritage railway in central Scotland. The 
analysis and risk prioritization method used by Network Rail was found to be unsuitable for 
direct application to heritage railways due to the different operating context. A new system 
was therefore developed, removing some risk factors from the Network Rail approach, 
adding others and modifying further ones. The new system was successfully applied and the 
Bo’ness and Kinneil Railway earthworks were found to be generally stable and safe.  
Introduction – Safety Risks on UK Heritage Railways 
In times when there is much talk of High Speed Rail, it is worth considering that the UK is 
home to a significant industry based on low speed rail – the heritage and tourist sector. 
There are currently over 100 heritage railways (HRs), employing 2,000 paid staff, 18,000 
volunteers, carrying 6.8 million passengers on 15 million passenger journeys, turning over 
£84  million and contributing an estimated £579 million to the UK economy (Lord Faulkner 
2011). 
Being passenger carrying railways, HRs are subject to exactly the same requirements for 
safety as any other passenger railway, though they are generally restricted to speeds of 
25mph or less. Whilst they have much lower annual tonnages of traffic than the main line 
system, they use historic steam and diesel locomotives, and consequently their axle loads 
can be relatively high, typically of the order of 25 tons. In most cases, heritage railways 
occupy track beds formerly part of the national rail network, often branch lines closed in the 
“Beeching Cuts” – the substantial reduction of the UK rail nework carried out while Dr 
Richard Beeching was chairman of British Rail in the 1960s (British Railways Board 1963a) 
(British Railways Board 1963b). In common with the rest of the UK network, their 
infrastructure often dates from a time when there was relatively little theoretical 
understanding, design or quality control, and typically no records exist either of construction 
or of maintenance. Further, whilst HRs sometimes rely on a core of paid employees, they 
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are generally staffed by volunteer enthusiasts who come from a wide range of backgrounds 
and in many cases do not have either long experience or formal technical qualifications. 
The UK HR sector has a good record of safety. From 1951 to 2010 there was a year-on-year 
reduction in safety incidents. However over the two years after that there was a significant 
reversal, with reportable incidents on over twenty railways, some staff fatalities and eight 
Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) enforcement notices, all of which are traceable to failings in 
the management structure of heritage railways (Keay 2012). The ORR regards this as so 
serious that special seminars were arranged via the Heritage Railway Association in an 
attempt to prevent further accidents.  
There have also been notable failures of earthworks. The Severn Valley Railway (SVR) was 
subject to a series of major earthwork failures following abnormally high rainfall events in 
June and July 2007, costing £3.7 million to repair (Sowden 2012), whilst the Gloucester and 
Warwickshire Railway (G&WR), which occupies a 10 mile former British Railways (BR) route 
between Toddington and Cheltenham Racecourse in central England, experienced two 
severe slips, at Gotherington in April 2010 and at Chicken Curve near Winchcombe in early 
2011. Both slips occurred in embankments where drainage was an issue and which had 
given trouble and required on-going maintenance in BR days and before (see 
http://www.gwst.com). Fortunately, neither the SVR nor the G&WR incidents led to loss of 
life. 
The Bo’ness and Kinneil Railway 
The Bo’ness and Kinneil Railway (B&KR) (see http://www.bkrailway.co.uk) is a five mile HR 
running from Bo’ness to a junction with the Network Rail (NR) Edinburgh & Glasgow main 
line. The HR was opened in stages from the early 1980s, but occupies the line of the 
Slammanan and Borrowstounness (Bo’ness) Railway opened in 1851. A map showing the 
location of the railway is included in Figure 1. 
For one and a half miles of its length, the line occupies the side of a steep escarpment close 
to the Forth Estuary between Bo’ness and Grangemouth, with the track supported on the 
north side by steep earth embankments, typically 15m high, and cut on the south side by soil 
and in some places rock slopes up to 10m high. (Figure 2). Thereafter the line turns south, 
passing through some moderately deep cuttings and over two further sections of 
embankment before reaching the mainline junction at Manuel. 
All the earth and rock structures have been subject to somewhat irregular, but reasonably 
frequent inspections by Independent Competent Persons (ie qualified permanent 
way/engineering staff not having a direct interest in the Railway), including in March 2010 
and May 2011, and are considered safe. However, they are almost all heavily vegetated, 
occasionally subject to animal burrowing and generally wet. No details of their construction 
or historic maintenance survive, though there is evidence of past failure due to washout in 
places and at one point the installation of a pipeline has led to a reconstruction. It cannot 
therefore be claimed that they represent a zero risk. 
Any failure of the B&KR earthworks, in addition to putting passengers and railway staff at 
risk, would have a very serious impact on business: apart from the heritage passenger 
trains, access is required to the mainline junction for movements of rail tour coaching stock, 
which brings in considerable revenue to the line’s owners. 
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In view of this, and bearing in mind the events described at the SVR and G&WR, together 
with the ORR’s concerns with management structures for safety, it has been determined that 
a proper risk-based assessment procedure is appropriate for the B&KR earthworks. The 
assessment procedure has to be commensurate with the HR operation, based on HR safety 
and business priorities and bearing in mind the volunteer staff who will operate it and the low 
speed, low traffic and low resource availability context of the B&KR and HR sector in 
general. 
The aim of this study was therefore to develop a risk assessment procedure for earthworks 
that is applicable to the HR sector bearing in mind its nature; and to apply this to the B&KR 
and use it to determine any monitoring or remedial actions necessary. 
Previous Work on Earthworks Risk Assessment 
The Bo’ness and Kinneil Railway 
Recent inspection reports by independent competent persons have noted that the B&KR 
earthworks “appear generally stable,” whilst noting the presence of mature slips and other 
minor issues (Watson 2010; Watson 2011). There is however currently no prioritization of 
inspection or maintenance activity on the B&KR and previous interventions have largely 
been reactive to incidents or perceived problems. 
Network Rail 
NR employs a risk-based approach to the prioritization of earthworks. This is a two-stage 
process, commencing with an analysis and scoring of the geotechnical hazard of various 
types failure. These geotechnical hazard scores are then converted to a likelihood of failure 
score and used in a prioritization algorithm that combines it with various potential 
consequences of failure. The process is explained in more detail in the following paragraphs. 
Geotechnical Hazard 
For earth slopes, NR uses the Soil Slope Hazard Index (SSHI) (Manley and Harding 2003). 
The entire network is divided into five chain (approximately 100m) lengths and each side of 
the railway is considered separately. A site inspection is carried out by a trained operative 
who examines over 30 separate parameters covering earthwork type, size and shape, 
vegetation and drainage as well as indicators of on-going or potential failure such as tension 
cracks, angled trees, presence of animal burrows, and other risk factors such as a history of 
track misalignment, past interventions or mining in the area. The values noted against the 
various factors are recorded using a Trimble™ hand-held computer with an inbuilt camera 
for photographing observations.  
The observed parameters are then fed into an algorithm derived by (Manley and Harding 
2003) to determine the SSHI. This accounts for five principal mechanisms in which 
earthworks can fail: rotational, translational, earthflow, washout and burrowing, and scores 
each section inspected for each of these mechanisms; the highest geotechnical hazard 
score (ie highest risk score) obtained is used to classify an individual 100m length as either 
serviceable, marginal, or poor for the failure mechanism to which the score corresponds. 
For rock slopes, a related process is used to assess the stability of the rock, based on the 
Rail Rock Slope Risk Appraisal (RRSRA) (McMillan and Manley 2003). 
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Poor slopes are then re-inspected at least every two years, marginal every five years and 
serviceable every ten years. 
Prioritization Calculation 
Having determined the numerical geotechnical hazard score, this is then fed into a more 
general prioritization algorithm derived by (Mott MacDonald and Network Rail 2006). This 
algorithm considers the likelihood and consequences of different potential failure 
mechanisms against four categories weighted for their relative significance, as shown in 
Table 1. These categories are Safety, Value for Money, Disruption and Environment. 
In addition to the geotechnical hazard, a variety of other factors contribute to these 
consequences, including track condition and significance of temporary speed restrictions 
(TSRs), track layout (straight, curved or switches and crossings), geographical weather risk, 
past failures, route speed, potential delay costs and the availability of alternative routes. 
Some of these are assessed on site and some by means of a desk study, but all must be 
determined for each five chain length of one side of the railway. 
Each factor contributes to some or all of the various consequences based on a relative 
scoring scheme, developed through a wide-ranging consultation and testing exercise by 
(Mott MacDonald and Network Rail 2006) (see   
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Table 2). For example, in terms of the geotechnical failure mode, potential rockfall and 
washout failures count for 24 (high risk) against all four consequence categories, whereas 
burrowing and earthflow count for 13 and 11 respectively (lower risk). Cuttings are scored at 
18, a greater risk than embankments at 14. On the other hand, route speed contributes only 
to safety and disruption and not to value for money or environment, with (obviously) higher 
speeds scoring a higher number of risk points than lower ones (2 for 0-79, mph, 5 for 80-
99mph, 8 for 100-110mph and 9 for 111-125mph). 
The risk points scored by each parameter against each consequence category are summed 
and the total multiplied by the weighting of the consequence category (Table 1). The four 
products are then summed to determine a total prioritization score. The highest score is 
taken as the highest risk priority for monitoring and engineering intervention. Full details of 
the original NR consequence scoring are included in   
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Table 2. 
This risk-based analysis has passed its accreditation process, it is credible to senior 
earthwork engineers and has been used by NR for a decade. In 2008, following three 
separate incidents involving earthworks failures, an investigation by the Rail Accident 
Investigation Branch (RAIB) concluded that the SSHI algorithm as adopted by Network Rail 
was technically sound whilst noting a number of issues regarding its implementation, 
principally related to variations in practices in different localities and the lack of a significant 
number of data points (ie earthwork-related incidents) to form a scientific judgement (RAIB 
2008). 
Assessing the Bo’ness and Kinneil Railway 
The NR approach was the obvious starting point for a logical and complete assessment of 
the B&KR earthworks. However, the NR methodology had to be adapted since access to the 
Trimble™ or indeed any hand-held computer was not possible. The parameters were 
therefore set out on a paper questionnaire, exactly as in the original NR scheme. The first 
one and a half miles of railway from Bo’ness station to where it passes under the main 
Bo’ness – Grangemouth road is on flat land (the foreshore area) with no earthworks present, 
so this section was excluded from the study. The remainder of the railway was divided into 
114 sections of length approximately 100m, each section being one side of the railway only. 
A questionnaire was filled in for each section. Questions to do with underlying geology and 
adjacent catchment area were answered by means of a preliminary desk study, the 
remainder being addressed on site during two visits to the line on 21 November and 5 
December 2011, when engineering possessions and associated protection arrangements 
ensured that there was no safety risk from train movements. Subsequently the responses 
were transferred to a spreadsheet which was in turn programmed to implement the SSHI 
algorithm and the prioritization process. 
Initial Results and Discussion 
The completion of the analysis, particularly filling in the questionnaire at the line side, is a 
process which clearly requires training. In this instance the authors carrying out the work 
were final year undergraduate MEng Civil Engineering students. They took some time to get 
used to the process but thereafter found the completion of the questionnaires to be relatively 
straightforward based on geotechnical engineering knowledge acquired during the preceding 
years of their degree programme. 
SSHI Results 
The SSHI (ie the geotechnical hazard) results are summarized in   
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Table 3. Of the poor slopes, most were cutting slopes (ie above rail level) on the south side 
of the railway, with some being cutting slopes located south of Birkhill Station, on both sides 
of the railway. Only a few were embankment slopes (below rail level) located near where the 
railway turns south away from the Forth estuary. A variety of potential failure modes were 
exhibited, with some of the high, steep embankment slopes giving indications of rotational 
and translational failure, and some of the cutting slopes appearing additionally vulnerable to 
washout and earth flow type failures. 
It is stressed that a result of poor does not mean that the earthwork presents an immediate 
safety hazard; it is rather an indication that monitoring is needed on at least a biennial basis 
to avoid a risk developing.  
Initial Prioritization 
In order to prioritize possible interventions on the B&KR earthworks, the prioritization toolkit 
was applied using all the original NR scheme unaltered. The main results of this analysis are 
shown in Figure 3, in which the prioritization of earthworks is indicated by the large boxed 
numbers, with 1 indicating the earthwork section with the highest priority for monitoring and 
possible intervention. Some areas have equal priority, and thus the same number appears 
twice; the priorities shown are not all consecutively numbered, as some of the priorities 
between 1 and 17 were on sections of the railway not covered by the figure. 
In this result, the top priority is at a location where there has been previous disturbance due 
to excavation for an oil pipeline crossing in the 1980s, and the consequence includes 
possible impact on the pipeline. This therefore appears to make sense. However, many of 
the next priorities are cutting sides on the south side of the railway. Applying engineering 
judgement, the prioritization of these areas makes much less sense, since examination on 
site, together with the experience of some small past failures suggested that the cutting 
sides could collapse with no significant consequence to third parties, there being only 
woodland or agricultural land on the top side of the cutting. There is also a wide area by the 
line side to accommodate any debris, and if any debris did fall on the rails, the visibility for 
train crews was generally sufficient to achieve a controlled stop in the distance available 
given the 20mph maximum line speed in the area. 
On the other hand, the embankment slopes given the 10th, 13th, 15th and 17th priorities had 
poor SSHIs and engineering judgement suggested that any failure here could have major 
impact on the railway. This would include undermining the track formation, severing the line 
and causing all income-generating operations to cease, as well as presenting a safety risk to 
trains and in some cases to owners of domestic property positioned below the railway. 
In view of this it was decided to re-assess the prioritization approach in the light of needs 
specific to HR operation. This was done with the assistance of a focus group consisting of 
ex-NR civil engineers, currently practising independent competent persons with both NR and 
HR experience and civil engineers with earthwork experience outwith the rail environment. 
Adapting NR Risk Weightings to HRs 
A number of issues were found when applying the NR prioritization in an HR context. In 
terms of the four generic consequence categories (Table 1), the presence of environmental 
appeared to be over-emphasised for HRs. This is not to say that HRs do not take 
environmental impact seriously, but in general this impact is probably low, and is strongly 
linked with factors such as tourism and traffic to access their stations. Thus, use of 
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environmental as a consequence category is unlikely to make significant distinction between 
priorities for earthwork monitoring or intervention. In the NR system, as well as 
environmental being a consequence category (Table 1), environmental obligations is a 
parameter considered under legal obligations (  
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Table 2) and it was felt that its presence here was sufficient for HRs without including it as a 
separate consequence category as well. 
Further, the value for money consequence was thought to be too complex and was therefore 
simplified to financial, covering the actual cost of repair of a damaged earthwork. Disruption 
was also modified, since detail such as delay minutes is less relevant to HR operations as 
no fines are payable to Train Operating Companies. Instead, disruption was used to 
consider indirect costs such as loss of income, the inability to run trains (including 
engineering trains) and impacts on reputation of the individual railway or the HR movement 
in general. 
Accordingly the consequence categories were re-defined for use on HRs as shown in  
Table 4. 
The prioritization scoring factors used by NR (  
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Table 2) then needed to be adapted to the new consequence categories shown in  
Table 4. Further issues were also identified with the prioritization scoring factors, as 
described in the following sections. 
Geotechnical Information 
NR prioritizes cuttings over embankments for statistical reasons, as more accidents have 
occurred due to cutting failure (RAIB 2008).For similar reasons, rock-falls and washouts are 
given a higher priority over other types of failure. However, these statistics, derived from NR 
operations, will not necessarily have any bearing on HR operations where conditions and in 
particular line speeds are very different, so (unless further information becomes available in 
the future) it was thought more appropriate to consider all these factors equally.NR also uses 
a geotechnical engineer’s assessment of earthwork (and rock slope) condition and trend as 
part of the geotechnical scoring, and this is unlikely to be generally available to many HRs 
which do not have geotechnical specialists available to make routine assessments. 
Track condition 
NR considers track condition, including geometry, trends and risks of temporary speed 
restrictions (TSRs) with impact on train operating companies (TOCs) in its risk assessment; 
however these factors are less relevant to HRs. Track condition is likely to be generally 
poorer than mainline standards but matters less at low line speeds, and the financial 
penalties of a TSR are also not relevant when line speed limits are always less than 25mph. 
Consequence Potential 
In this general category, the NR system considers route sensitivity, which covers the 
availability of a diversion for through traffic. This is clearly irrelevant to HRs. Route speed, 
flexibility of wrong-line running on multiple tracks and potential delay payments to TOCs are 
also not relevant. 
Other Projects 
Though not irrelevant, the treatment of opportunities and drivers associated with other 
projects were thought to be overly complex for HR implementation and suitable for 
simplification. 
On the other hand, it was considered that there were a number of factors relevant to HRs 
that were not included in the NR system. These are as follows. 
Site Access 
On the B&KR, and many other heritage railways, access for plant and personnel to repair a 
damaged earthwork, particularly if the railway itself was no longer passable, would be a 
serious issue. This was, in fact a notable issue in the repairs to the SVR after the 2007 
flooding (Sowden 2012). It is therefore more important to maintain difficult-to-access 
earthworks in a serviceable state than is the case for the more accessible ones. 
Detectability of Failure 
A key issue for HRs is the likelihood of incipient failure being detected; this will have a clear 
impact on the safety consequence, and is likely to be more variable on HRs relying on 
volunteer staff with diverse responsibilities, as opposed to NR where there is a clearly set 
out inspection programme with dedicated staff to administer it. Some earthworks and rock 
slopes will be more frequently observed, for example those near staffed stations, whereas 
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features in more remote locations, where there is heavy vegetation or features above cutting 
horizons, are less likely to be noticed. It was thought that this variability should be included in 
a risk assessment for HRs. 
Shared Responsibility 
This factor was added to account for situations such as the pipeline crossing on the B&KR 
where the earthwork, and consequently any repairs, would be a shared responsibility with 
the pipeline operators. In general this will apply in many HR contexts such as where the 
earthwork supports a highway bridge structure or adjacent road. 
New Prioritization for the B&KR 
In view of the foregoing discussion, a revised prioritization scoring against the new 
consequence categories ( 
Table 4) was prepared which it is thought more accurately reflects the situation on the B&KR 
and on other HRs. This is detailed in 
Consequence Category Definition Weighting 
Safety The level of safety of the 
travelling public, HR staff or third 
parties 
0.4 
Financial The direct costs resulting from an 
earthwork failure; eg the cost of 
repair of an earthwork and any 
damages incurred by the failure 
including third parties 
0.25 
Disruption Indirect costs of failure such as 
loss of earnings due to inability to 
run passenger services; 
The inability to run trains 
including works trains; and  
The effect on the reputation of 
the HR or the HR movement 
generally 
0.35 
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Table 5. For factors that are unaltered from the original system, the scoring remains the 
same. For new categories scores have been determined based on engineering judgement of 
their relative significance. 
For added clarity, a comparison of the original NR scheme and the new prioritization scheme 
is shown, without scoring, in   
13 
 
Table 6. 
Revised Results 
The new HR prioritization scheme was applied to the B&KR. No change was made to the 
SSHI calculation, for which the results remain as shown in   
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Table 3. These were used with the consequence factors in   
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Table 5 to calculate revised priorities for monitoring and engineering intervention. 
The revised priorities are indicated in Figure 4. They now tie in much more effectively with 
engineering judgement, the high, steep and sometimes wet embankment slopes north of the 
railway being given the highest priorities. If damaged, these embankments would potentially 
undermine the line, perhaps in a way not immediately noticeable from the driving cab of an 
approaching train, and they might result in collapse onto line side property. The resulting 
disruption would entirely remove the railway’s access to an income stream either from sale 
of passenger tickets or revenue associated with rail tour movements for which mainline 
access from Bo’ness Station is required.  
Monitoring and Remediation 
The application of the SSHI calculation and revised prioritization merely calculates a relative 
risk for given sections of earthwork or rock slope. It does not indicate the presence or 
absence of an absolute problem; this determination will always rely on on-site inspection by 
suitably qualified engineers. In the case of the B&KR this has been done, being formally 
reported in (Watson 2011) and informally on more recent occasions. There have been minor 
issues connected with the need to repair drainage ditching, and minor slips associated with 
large trees being uprooted by winter gales, but the underlying stability of all the earth and 
rock slopes is not currently in question. 
However, in the light of the collapses on the SVR and G&WR previously mentioned, and 
bearing in mind the railway’s responsibility for the safety of its staff, passengers and 
neighbours, it is appropriate to take steps to manage any potential risk. It is therefore 
proposed to repeat the risk assessment inspections on a regular basis. 
It was notable in both the SVR and G&WR cases that failures were related to drainage 
issues, where in some cases the existence and operation of culverts was previously 
unknown (Sowden 2012). A careful investigation of all drainage structures on the B&KR has 
thus been carried out to ensure that this situation is less likely to arise. 
Further, it is commonly noted that earthwork failure is rarely sudden and without warning (for 
example (Bonnett 2005) section 6.5, p85), and simple monitoring techniques are available to 
give early warning, the most obvious one being tell-tales, which consist of a number of pegs 
set out in a straight line. Any siginificant movement of the earthwork would result in pegs 
moving out of line, which would be readily observable even by an unqualified staff member. 
The matter could then be further investigated and potential consequences reduced. Four 
sets of tell-tales have therefore been placed in priority areas 1 to 4 as shown on Figure 4, 
and will be inspected regularly, with the distance from the running edge of the rail and track 
cant being monitored at each peg (Figure 5). 
Conclusion and Further Work 
A risk assessment has been carried out on the Bo’ness and Kinneil Railway with the aim of 
managing potential hazards associated with earthworks and rock slopes supporting a HR. 
Techniques used by NR to calculate a SSHI and prioritize risk were found to be unsuitable 
for HR application due to the irrelevance of a number of factors used in determining the 
severity of potential consequences and the absence of other factors important to HR 
operations. A revised approach was created taking into account the specific context in which 
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HRs work, and the revised prioritization gave risk results that related well to engineering 
judgement regarding the structures in question.  
It is concluded that at present the earth and rock slopes on the B&KR are not a cause for 
concern; however the revised risk management process works well and should be applied 
regularly, with the highest risk slopes being subject to more frequent formal inspection and 
recording, with the assistance of simple monitoring techniques to give early warning of any 
slope movement. This will provide continued reassurance that the B&KR formation remains 
safe for traffic. 
Work on this project is continuing, to provide a more user-friendly method of implementation 
commensurate with volunteer inspectors in a HR environment, and to trial the method on 
other HRs, which may lead to further developments in the prioritization scoring, particularly 
for the new factors introduced as part of this work. 
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Figure 1: Map of the Bo’ness and Kinneil Railway 
© Crown Copyright/database right 2013. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service 
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Figure 2: The Bo’ness and Kinneil Railway showing typical cutting and embankment structure 
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 Figure 3: Earthworks Prioritization based on Network Rail weightings 
Base map © Crown Copyright/database right 2013. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service 
 
 
Figure 4: Earthworks prioritization based on Heritage Railway weightings 
Base map © Crown Copyright/database right 2013. An Ordnance Survey/EDINA supplied service 
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Figure 5: Setting out tell-tales in a priority area 
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Table 1: Network Rail Consequence Categories (Mott MacDonald and Network Rail 2006) 
 
Consequence Category Definition Weighting 
Safety The level of safety of the 
travelling public, NR staff or third 
parties 
0.4 
Value for Money The optimum combination of 
whole-life cost and quality 
0.25 
Disruption The effect of disruption to the NR 
network either by delay minutes, 
adverse publicity or other factors 
0.25 
Environment A positive or detrimental effect 
on the environment 
0.1 
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Table 2: Network Rail Prioritization Scoring (Mott MacDonald and Network Rail 2006)  
Category Parameter 
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Hazard Options 
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Geotechnical 
Information 
Earthwork Type X X X X Embankment 
Cutting 
Bund (ie not supporting track) 
14 
18 
6 
Failure Mode X X X X Rockfall 
Rotation 
Translation 
Earthflow 
Washout 
Burrowing 
Subsidence/Settlement 
24 
19 
19 
11 
24 
13 
16 
Predicted Earthwork 
Condition Trend 
X X X X No significant deterioration 
Gradual deterioration 
Rapid deterioration 
0 
4 
6 
Track Condition 
Track Recording 
Vehicle (TRV) Data – 
Current Track 
Condition 
X  X  green – good 
yellow – satisfactory 
blue – poor 
red – very poor 
cyan – super red 
0 
1 
2 
4 
6 
TRV Data – Trends X  X  No significant deterioration 
Gradual deterioration 
Rapid deterioration 
0 
2 
4 
Risk of Temporary 
Speed Restrictions 
X X X  N/A 
Low risk 
Medium risk 
High risk 
0 
3 
6 
9 
Track Layout 
Track layout X  X  Straight track/flat curve 
Curve – high cant/cant deficiency 
S&C/Tilting curve 
2 
4 
5 
Geographic 
Weather Risk 
Geographic Weather 
Risk (including flooding 
potential) 
X  X  Very high 
High 
Medium 
Low 
7 
6 
4 
2 
Past Failures 
Past Failures X  X  No previous local failures or 
normalized delay minutes 0-60% 
Some known local failures or 
normalized delay minutes 60-90% 
Extensive local failures or 
normalized delay minutes 90-
100% 
3 
 
5 
 
7 
Consequence 
Potential 
Route Sensitivity  X X  Very high – primary route 
High (London commuter routes 
and main secondary routes) 
Medium (secondary routes) 
Low (rural) 
Very low (freight) 
8 
7 
 
5 
3 
1 
Impact on other assets X X X X Track 
OHLE 
Power/telecom cables/signalling 
Signalling equipment 
NR Structures 
3
rd
 Party structures 
4 
3 
3 
4 
1 
1 
Route Speed X  X  0-79 
80-99 
100-110 
111-125 
2 
5 
8 
9 
Infrastructure Flexibility  X X  U/D (ie single bi-directional) 
UD 
8 
7 
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UUDD 
UDUD 
5 
3 
Potential Delay Costs  X X  High 
Medium 
Low 
7 
4 
1 
Legal 
Requirements 
3
rd
 Party Liabilities / 
Legal Obligations 
 X X X Very significant 
Significant 
Not significant 
7 
5 
0 
Environmental 
Obligations 
 X X X Very significant 
Significant 
Not significant 
4 
3 
0 
Available 
Mitigations 
e.g. drainage, 
vegetation, TSR, 
watchmen, track 
maintenance etc. 
X X X X Feasible long term – low cost 
Feasible long term – high cost 
Feasible short term – low cost 
Feasible short term – high cost 
Not feasible 
0 
4 
6 
8 
9 
Other Projects Opportunities provided 
by other projects 
X X X X High 
Medium 
Low 
None 
4 
2 
1 
0 
Drivers from other 
projects 
X X X X Significant constraints 
Moderate constraints 
Minor constraints 
N/A 
7 
5 
3 
0 
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Table 3: SSHI Results for Bo’ness and Kinneil Railway 
SSHI Geotechnical 
Hazard 
Number of 100m lengths of 
one side of Railway 
% of All Slopes on Railway 
Poor 25 22 
Marginal 49 43 
Servicable 40 35 
 
Table 4: New Heritage Railway Consequence Categories 
Consequence Category Definition Weighting 
Safety The level of safety of the 
travelling public, HR staff or third 
parties 
0.4 
Financial The direct costs resulting from an 
earthwork failure; eg the cost of 
repair of an earthwork and any 
damages incurred by the failure 
including third parties 
0.25 
Disruption Indirect costs of failure such as 
loss of earnings due to inability to 
run passenger services; 
The inability to run trains 
including works trains; and  
The effect on the reputation of 
the HR or the HR movement 
generally 
0.35 
 
  
25 
 
Table 5: New Heritage Railway Prioritization Scoring 
Category Parameter 
S
a
fe
ty
 
F
in
a
n
c
ia
l 
D
is
ru
p
ti
o
n
 
Hazard Options 
S
c
o
ri
n
g
 
Geotechnical 
Information 
Failure Mode X X X Rockfall 
Rotation 
Translation 
Earthflow 
Washout 
Burrowing 
Subsidence/Settlement 
24 
19 
19 
11 
24 
13 
16 
Site Access 
X X X Easy 
Moderate 
Obstructed 
0 
5 
9 
Detectability 
X X X High 
Medium 
Low 
0 
2 
4 
Track Layout 
Track layout X  X Straight track/flat curve 
Curve – high cant/cant deficiency 
S&C 
2 
4 
5 
Geographic 
Weather Risk 
Geographic Weather 
Risk (including flooding 
potential) 
X  X Very high 
High 
Medium 
Low 
7 
6 
4 
2 
Past Failures 
Past Failures X  X No previous local failures or normalized 
delay minutes 0-60% 
Some known local failures or 
normalized delay minutes 60-90% 
Extensive local failures or normalized 
delay minutes 90-100% 
3 
 
5 
 
7 
 Impact on other assets X X X Track 
Power/telecom cables/signalling 
Signalling equipment 
NR Structures 
3
rd
 Party structures 
4 
3 
4 
1 
1 
Legal 
Requirements 
3
rd
 Party Liabilities / 
Legal Obligations 
 X X Very significant 
Significant 
Not significant 
7 
5 
0 
Environmental 
Obligations 
 X X Very significant 
Significant 
Not significant 
4 
3 
0 
Shared Responsibility  X X Yes 
No 
0 
3 
Available 
Mitigations 
e.g. drainage, vegetation, 
TSR, watchmen, track 
maintenance etc. 
X X X Feasible long term – low cost 
Feasible long term – high cost 
Feasible short term – low cost 
Feasible short term – high cost 
Not feasible 
0 
4 
6 
8 
9 
Other Projects Opportunities and drivers 
provided by other 
projects 
X X X High 
Medium 
Low 
None 
7 
5 
3 
0 
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Table 6: Comparison between original NR and new consequence factors 
 
 Original NR Prioritization Factors New HR Prioritization Factors 
Category Parameter 
S
a
fe
ty
 
V
a
lu
e
 f
o
r 
M
o
n
e
y
 
D
is
ru
p
ti
o
n
 
E
n
v
ir
o
n
m
e
n
ta
l 
Parameter 
S
a
fe
ty
 
F
in
a
n
c
ia
l 
D
is
ru
p
ti
o
n
 
Geotechnical Information Earthwork Type X X X X  
Failure Mode X X X X Failure Mode X X X 
Predicted Earthwork 
Condition Trend 
X X X X  
 Site Access X X X 
Detectability X X X 
Track Condition Track Recording Vehicle 
(TRV) Data – Current 
Track Condition 
X  X   
TRV Data – Trends X  X  
Risk of Temporary Speed 
Restrictions 
X X X  
Track Layout Track Layout X  X  Track Layout X  X 
Geographic Weather 
Risk 
Geographic Weather 
Risk (including flooding 
potential) 
X  X  Geographic Weather 
Risk (including flooding 
potential) 
X  X 
Past Failures Past Failures X  X  Past Failures X  X 
Consequence Potential Route Sensitivity  X X   
Impact on other assets X X X X Impact on other assets X X X 
Route Speed X  X   
Infrastructure Flexibility  X X  
Potential Delay Costs  X X  
Legal Requirements 3
rd
 Party Liabilities/Legal 
Obligations 
 X X X 3
rd
 Party Liabilities/Legal 
Obligations 
 X X 
Environmental 
Obligations 
 X X X Environmental 
Obligations 
 X X 
 Shared Responsibility  X X 
Available Mitigations e.g. drainage, vegetation, 
TSR, watchmen, track 
maintenance etc. 
X X X X e.g. drainage, vegetation, 
TSR, watchmen, track 
maintenance etc. 
X X X 
Other Projects Opportunities provided by 
other projects 
X X X X  
Drivers from other 
projects 
X X X X 
 Opportunities and drivers 
provided by other 
projects 
X X X 
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